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Abstract 
Signal detection in cognitive radio network (CRN) is influenced by several factors. One of them is 
malicious user that emulate primary user (PU) signal. Emulation of PU signal causes detection error. This 
paper investigates the impact of malicious user attack to PU signal detection. A number of malicious users 
are randomly deployed around secondary user (SU) at a certain distance. They attempt to attack primary 
signal detection that is transmitted from 100 km to SU receiver. Then, the received signal power at 
secondary receiver and the performance of probability of false alarm and probability of miss detection 
under two hypothesis of Neyman Pearson criterion are studied. The derived results show that a number of 
malicious users has a significant impact to the performance of received power at SU and detection error 
rate. 
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1. Introduction 
Due to increasing demand of wireless users cause scarcity of spectrum. Therefore, 
spectrum must be efficiently used to accommodate users at one time. Researchers and 
engineers have been intensively investigating solution for efficiency of spectrum use since a few 
years ago. They propose new paradigm and regulation where replacing fix spectrum access into 
dynamic spectrum access (DSA) system. In DSA system, unlicensed users dynamically access 
available spectrum and hop to others spectrum when licensed user return to use.  
Cognitive Radio (CR) was nominated as DSA system. This technique is possible to 
opportunistically access the license spectrum bands when it is available [1]. Unlicensed user 
continuously monitors license spectrum for possible accessible. An exhaustive sensing must be 
periodically performed to achieve sensing outcome properly.  
Spectrum sensing is a first task for unlicensed user that continuously monitors available 
spectrum. It must be well performed prior to access channel spectrum.  Unlicensed users must 
strictly confirm that channel is genuinely available to avoid collision with licensed user activity. A 
lots of research related spectrum sensing and its performance has been conducted such as 
presented in [2-4].  
Interferences (i.e. fading, noise, hidden and exposed nodes, etc) are occurred in 
channel detection. These noises certainly influence sensing outcomes and cause detection 
errors, such as miss detection and false detection. Such errors make unlicensed user misses 
the opportunity to access spectrum or collision among licensed and unlicensed users.  
Cognitive radio networks vulnerable to attack by malicious user. All functionalities of CR 
networks such as spectrum sensing, spectrum mobility, spectrum sharing, and spectrum 
management are potentially vulnerable to attack [5]. The presence of malicious users 
significantly affects the detection performance in cognitive radio network (CRN). A user acts as 
disturber due to selfish or malfunction sensor reasons. A malicious user can transmit fake signal 
as if signal transmission from licensed user. Then, unlicensed user refrains from channel 
access. Malicious user can also have a jamming attack to license user signal. Unlicensed user 
estimates the spectrum is available and starts to access and transmit a signal. Unfortunately, it 
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causes collision amongst licensed and unlicensed users. Primary user emulation (PUE) attack 
is considered as a source of interference in CRN and causes signal detection errors. 
Malicious users are capable to harm spectrum sensing process. As an attacker, they 
may transmit fake signal as primary signal in licensed band. Detection of fake signal causes 
SUs preventing from spectrum access [6]. In [7], Chen et al., studied the use of PU location to 
identify primary user emulation attack (PUEA). They used directional antennas to determine the 
angle of primary signal, the time arrival, and signal strength of received signal for location of 
primary transmitter detection. The first analytical model to achieve a lower bound on the 
probability of successful PUEA was discussed in [8]. The authors considered fading into 
analysis and derived expressions for the probability of successful PUEA and provide a lower 
bound on the probability of successful PUEA using Fenton’s and Markov approximation, 
respectively. Moreover, authors in [9] applied Wald’s sequential probability ratio test to detect 
the attack by malicious users. Authors in [10] investigated strategies to combat primary user 
attack caused by selfish and malicious user attacks. They used game theory-based to counter 
primary user attack in cognitive radio networks. Authors in [11] studied primary user emulation 
attack in dynamic spectrum access without location information of users. They presented miss 
detection as a function of network radius with different number of SU for both theoretical and 
experimental studies. However, they did not present false detection probability and how the 
performance of received power by SU with a certain number of transmitted power from PU was 
not studied. 
This paper studies the performance of PU signal detection due to malicious user as 
attacker. We study the received signal at secondary user due to primary transmission and 
malicious users. Two hypothesis of Neyman Pearson decision criterion is used to study 
statistical signal detection error. The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section II 
discusses system model and assumption used in simulation. Theoretical analysis and 
calculation is presented in section III. Section IV discusses numerical and simulation results. 
Finally, conclusion is briefly presented in Section V. 
 
 
2. System Model 
Security issue in cognitive radio networks pays more attention in recent year. Attacker 
to PU causes errors in signal detection. Errors in primary signal detection could be false and 
miss detection. Malicious user identifies vacant bands. Secondary user refrains to access those 
bands since malicious user transmits signal as if it comes from PU. In other case, malicious 
user prevents SU to detect PU signal, hence it is seen the bands are available for access. 
However, in fact, bands are used by PU. 
Figure 1 describes a simple model of CRN. Assumption is made that malicious users 
(M) are actively available and ready to attack in the network system. These users are circularly 
distributed with radius R and independently transmit amongst each other’s. Secondary user is 
placed at the center of the network and separated to primary user with a distance D. Coordinate 
of primary transmitter is fixed at           and transmit power Pt. Secondary user is free of 
malicious users at the range of radius Ro which is known as the exclusive radius of SU.   
 
 
R
Ro
Dp
Secondary user
Malicious user
Primary transmitter
 
 
Figure 1. System model of cognitive radio networks with malicious users 
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3. Numerical Analysis 
This section discusses numerical modeling for the assumption earlier. Let us consider 
M malicious users at         where 1≤j≤M. Calculation of probability density function (PDF) of    
as given in [11]: 
 
      
   
      
                                         (1) 
 
Where    is uniformly distributed in (    ). The received power at secondary user from primary 
transmitted is given by the following formula: 
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Where       
  
              . Since    and    are fixed, then the PDF of   
    follows a log 
normal distribution and can be written as the following calculation. 
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Where   
    
  
 and                       . 
The total received power at the secondary user from all malicious users can be given 
by: 
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The values of    and   
  are the distance and shadowing between     malicious user and 
secondary user, respectively. 
  
     
  
   where         
 
  . The right side of the equation (4) is log normally 
distributed random variable of the form   
  
   where          
 
  , where    is given by: 
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The PDF of   
  conditioned on the positions of all malicious users can be written as the 
following equation: 
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  is the vector elements       ,…,   . The values of  
 
  and    are given as the 
following equation: 
 
  
  
 
  
     
   
   
 
     
     
   
   
    
    
                 (7) 
 
   
 
 
              
 
 
   
    
                 (8) 
 
The PDF of the received power from malicious users can be derived by: 
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This equation is approximately calculated by a log normally distributed random variable 
with parameters    and    as: 
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Supposed that   
  is a log normally distributed random variable, then    and    can be 
derived by: 
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From equation (6) average probability of   
  and     
     simply is calculated by the 
following equation: 
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Where, 
  
                
                    (14) 
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Hence, 
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By integrating equation over range of       ,…,   , it becomes: 
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If secondary user position at (0, 0), it means that      . 
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Then, let us consider two hypotheses in Neyman Pearson decision criterion, where M1 
is primary transmission in progress, and M2 is emulation attack in progress. There are two types 
of detection error. Those are false alarm, where secondary user detects transmission, but it 
comes from malicious user, and miss detection means secondary user detects transmission 
from malicious user, but it comes from primary user. 
Decision variable is calculated by using power of received signal as follows: 
 
  
     
        
                (19) 
 
The derived value of   is then compared with the threshold for decision as bellows: 
       : Primary transmission 
       : PUEA in progress 
Then, probability of errors depends on the decision rule as given bellows: 
         = probability of missed detection, where decides    when   is true. 
         = probability of false alarm, where decides    when   is true. 
These two probability of errors can be expresses mathematically as follows: 
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In this section, it is explained the results of research and at the same time is given the 
comprehensive discussion. Results can be presented in figures, graphs, tables and others that 
make the reader understand easily [2], [5]. The discussion can be made in several sub-
chapters. 
 
 
4. Results and Discussion 
This section discusses the performance of signal detection under PUEA in cognitive 
radio network. As illustrated in Figure 1, a simple model of cognitive radio network, secondary 
user is located in the center of circular network with R=1000m, Ro= 30m,      ,       , 
        , primary transmitter power         with distance Dp = 100 km to secondary user.  
Probability of density function (pdf) for received power at secondary user is shown in Figure 2. 
We studied the derived theoretical and simulation results. This comparison has identical values 
and reach maximum at a certain point. Then, number of malicious users is reset to 15 users 
where the rest of setup remains the same values. The result is shown in Figure 3. 
Furthermore, probability of error rate is investigated. Cumulative density function for error rate of 
primary signal detection is shown in Figure 3. Probability of false alarm and probability of miss 
detection is derived with threshold,     and number of 25 malicious users interfere primary 
signal detection. Figure 4 shows probability of error rate with 10 number of malicious user, 
where the rest of setup remains the same values 
 
 
 
Figure 2. Probability of density function for received power at secondary user from primary 
transmitter        , M = 30 
 
 
Figure 3. Probability of density function for received power at secondary user from primary 
transmitter        , M = 15 
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Figure 3. Cumulative density function with threshold             , and M = 25 
 
 
Figure 4. Cumulative density function with threshold             , and M = 10 
 
 
5. Conclusion 
Interference of primary signal detection caused by a number of malicious user has been 
studied with Neyman Pearson criterion. The statistical characteristic of probability of false alarm 
and probability of missed detection is also demonstrated. The derived results show that primary 
user emulation attack due to malicious user decreases detection performance. Error rate 
increases due to miss detection and false alarm. It influences performance of signal detection 
and decreases fidelity of sensing outcomes. This study considered one primary transmitter 
located at a certain distance to SU. We will consider two or multiple primary base station at 
different distances to SU transmit signal continuously for further study. Evaluation the impact of 
power transmitter of malicious user and PU, then how far number of malicious user influences 
signal detection will be further investigated.  
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